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Lawyers

The implications of Canadian federalism for the regulation of lawyers for the federal
government are largely overlooked in the literature and case law. This article
argues that employees of the federal government can practice law without being
licensed by the corresponding provincial law society (or any law society). However,
if they happen to be licensed by a law society, they can be disciplined by that
law society—unless and until Parliament adopts legislation immunizing them from
law society discipline. The article also considers the possibility that Parliament
could create a separate bar for federal government lawyers. It concludes that
some form of regulatory and disciplinary jurisdiction over federal government
lawyers is necessary to protect the public interest and public condence in federal
government lawyers.
Les implications du fédéralisme canadien sur la réglementation des avocats à
l’emploi du gouvernement fédéral sont largement négligées dans la littérature
et la jurisprudence. Dans le présent article, nous soutenons que les employés
du gouvernement fédéral peuvent pratiquer le droit sans être autorisés par le
barreau provincial correspondant (ou tout autre barreau). Cependant, s’ils sont
autorisés par un barreau, ils peuvent être sanctionnés par ce dernier, à moins
que le législateur n’adopte une loi les immunisant contre la discipline du barreau.
Dans l’article, nous envisageons également la possibilité que le législateur crée
un barreau distinct pour les avocats du gouvernement fédéral. Nous concluons
qu’une certaine forme de compétence réglementaire et disciplinaire à l’égard des
avocats du gouvernement fédéral est nécessaire pour protéger l’intérêt public et la
conance du public dans les avocats à l’emploi du gouvernement fédéral.
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Introduction
Canadian federalism has legal implications for the regulation of lawyers
for the federal government, but these implications are largely overlooked
in the literature and case law. The federal government is one of the largest,
if not the largest, legal employers in Canada. It has more than 2500
lawyers across the country, primarily in the Department of Justice and the
Public Prosecution Service of Canada.1 Recent literature has assessed the
jurisdiction of provincial law societies over lawyers in government roles—
1.
Almost a decade ago, Adam Dodek wrote that “Canada’s largest law entity is actually the federal
Department of Justice and not one of the national law rms…. With over 2,700 lawyers, it is more
than twice the size of the largest law rm.” (Adam M Dodek, “Lawyering at the Intersection of Public
Law and Legal Ethics: Government Lawyers as Custodians of the Rule of Law” (2010) 33:1 Dal LJ 1
at 4 [citation omitted]). More recently, see e.g. Andrew Flavelle Martin, “Legal Ethics and the Political
Activity of Government Lawyers” (2018) 49:2 Ottawa L Rev 263 [Martin, “Government Lawyers’
Political Activity”] at 303 n 138: “According to gures from the Association of Justice Counsel, there
are approximately 2600 lawyers in the federal government” [citation omitted].
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the Attorney General, lawyer-politicians, and government lawyers—
and examined particular ethical issues facing such lawyers.2 However,
this literature has largely focused on lawyers employed by provincial
governments, and at most has agged the possibility of federalism
considerations changing the legal answers for lawyers employed by
the federal government.3 While some literature and case law addresses
these implications in passing, there is no determinative let alone in-depth
analysis of them.
Regulation of the professions falls under provincial jurisdiction over
“Property and Civil Rights” in section 92(13) of the Constitution Act,
1867, and regulation of the legal profession may also fall under “The
Administration of Justice in the Province” in section 92(14).4 Thus, it

2.
Attorney General: Andrew Flavelle Martin, “The Legal Ethics Implications of the SNC-Lavalin
Affair for the Attorney General of Canada” (2019) 67:3 Crim LQ 161 [Martin, “SNC-Lavalin”];
Andrew Flavelle Martin, “The Immunity of the Attorney General to Law Society Discipline” (2016)
94:2 Can Bar Rev 413 [Martin, “Attorney General Immunity”]; Brent Cotter, “The Prime Minister v
the Chief Justice of Canada: The Attorney General’s Failure of Responsibility” (2015) 18 Leg Ethics
73; Andrew Flavelle Martin, “The Attorney General as Lawyer (?): Condentiality upon Resignation
from Cabinet” (2015) 38:1 Dal LJ 147 [Martin, “Attorney General Resignation”]. Lawyer-Politicians:
Andrew Flavelle Martin, “Legal Ethics versus Political Practices: The Application of the Rules
of Professional Conduct to Lawyer-Politicians” (2013) 91:1 Can Bar Rev 1 [Martin, “LawyerPoliticians”]; Andrew Flavelle Martin, “Consequences for Broken Political Promises: LawyerPoliticians and the Rules of Professional Conduct” (2016) 10:2 JPPL 337 [Martin, “Consequences
for Lawyer-Politicians”]. (I follow here the denition of lawyer-politicians as politicians who happen
to be lawyers, i.e., politicians whose ofcial functions do not include the practice of law: Martin,
“Lawyer-Politicians” at 3.) Government lawyers: John Mark Keyes, “Loyalty, Legality and Public
Sector Lawyers” (2019) 97:1 Can Bar Rev 756 [Keyes, “Loyalty”]; Andrew Flavelle Martin &
Candice Telfer, “The Impact of the Honour of the Crown on the Ethical Obligations of Government
Lawyers: A Duty of Honourable Dealing” (2018) 41:2 Dal LJ 443; Martin, “Government Lawyers’
Political Activity,” supra note 1; Eric Pierre Boucher, “Civil Crown Counsel: Lore Masters of the
Rule of Law” (2018) 12 JPPL 463; Elizabeth Sanderson, Government Lawyering: Duties and Ethical
Challenges of Government Lawyers (Toronto: LexisNexis Canada, 2018).
3.
Martin, “Lawyer Politicians,” supra note 2 at 20 dismisses the potential for law societies to
discipline federal lawyer-politicians as “merely one of many quirks created by a federal system.”
Martin, “Attorney General Immunity,” supra note 2 at 444, n 149 raises the possibility that Parliament
could immunize the Attorney General in federal legislation “in order to protect the proper federal
jurisdiction over criminal law.” Martin, “Government Lawyers’ Political Activity,” supra note 1 at
299 notes that federalism considerations might preclude federal legislation on government employees
from prevailing over provincial legislation on the legal profession. While Keyes, “Loyalty,” supra
note 2 focuses on federal government lawyers, he makes no mention of federalism. Similarly, while
Sanderson, supra note 2 focuses more on lawyers for the federal than provincial and territorial
governments, she focuses little on federalism (other than her proposition for a federal government
lawyer code and “over-sight regim[e]” at 3-5).
4.
Constitution Act, 1867 (UK), 30 & 31 Vict, c 3, reprinted in RSC 1985, Appendix II, No 5; Law
Society of BC v Mangat, 2001 SCC 67 at paras 38-41 (92(13)), 42-46 (92(14)), [2001] 3 SCR 113
[Mangat], applied e.g. in Krieger v Law Society of Alberta, 2002 SCC 65 at para 33, [2002] 3 SCR
372 [Krieger]. Section 92(14) reads in full: “The Administration of Justice in the Province, including
the Constitution, Maintenance, and Organization of Provincial Courts, both of Civil and of Criminal
Jurisdiction, and including Procedure in Civil Matters in those Courts.”
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is provincial legislation on the legal profession that denes the practice
of law, prohibits the unlicensed practice of law, and delegates to each
provincial law society the power to regulate the practice of law—including
the power to prosecute unlawful practice—and the legal profession in the
public interest.5 Through that legislation or other legislation, provincial
legislatures can modify the regulation of lawyers for the provincial
government, such as exempting them from licensing requirements or
immunizing them from law society jurisdiction.6
While the scope of federal jurisdiction over the legal profession and
the practice of law is clear in some respects, it is not clear what power
Parliament has over the regulation of lawyers for the federal government.
The literature and case law are mixed as to whether federal government
lawyers are bound by legislation on the legal profession and subject to
regulation by the law societies. The Supreme Court of Canada in Krieger
v Law Society of Alberta asserted that law societies have the same
disciplinary jurisdiction over federal Crown prosecutors as they do over
provincial Crown prosecutors:
A law society has the jurisdiction to review the conduct of a federal or
provincial Crown prosecutor to determine whether the prosecutor has
acted dishonestly or in bad faith in exercising prosecutorial discretion or
fullling the disclosure obligations of the Crown. As members of their
respective law societies, federal Crown prosecutors are subject to the
same ethical obligations as all other members of the bar and not immune
to discipline for dishonest or bad faith conduct.7

However, the issue before the Court in Krieger was only whether provincial
law societies had jurisdiction over provincial Crown prosecutors—an issue
that raises different federalism concerns—and so this aspect of Krieger
was obiter.8 (I will re-assess the implications of the ratio and the obiter in
Krieger below.9) Importantly for the purposes of this article, the Court did

5.
See e.g. Legal Profession Act, SBC 1998, c 9; Law Society Act, RSO 1990, c L.8; Legal
Profession Act, SNS 2004, c 28.
6.
See e.g. s 13 of the Law Society Act, supra note 5, immunizing the Attorney General from law
society jurisdiction, discussed e.g. in Martin, “Attorney General Immunity,” supra note 2 at 437.
7.
Krieger, supra note 4 at para 56.
8.
The Court in Krieger, ibid at paras 33-39 considered, and rejected, the argument that the
Law Society of Alberta’s rule addressing conduct by prosecutors was ultra vires the province as
an intrusion into federal jurisdiction over criminal law and criminal procedure in section 91(27) of
the Constitution Act, 1867, supra note 4 (“The Criminal Law, except the Constitution of Courts of
Criminal Jurisdiction, but including the Procedure in Criminal Matters.”).
9.
See below notes 97 to 99 and corresponding text.
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not consider the issue of whether federal government lawyers can indeed
be required to be members of law societies.10
In contrast to Krieger, some commentators have asserted or argued
that federal government lawyers are immune from provincial law society
regulation. Deborah MacNair has asserted that “there is a … constitutional
issue concerning jurisdiction over the affairs of federal lawyers, which
necessitates certain regulatory limitations.”11 She has expanded on this
assertion elsewhere, in the specic context of federal lawyers who draft
legislation, arguing that while “[t]he courts have not considered the specic
case of federal lawyers… it is reasonable to conclude that the law society
does not regulate federal legislative drafters, including their mandate or the
licensing requirements that apply to them.”12 (MacNair argues by analogy
to the decision of the Federal Court of Appeal in The Queen in Right of
Canada v Lefebvre et al,13 which I will consider below.14) Similarly, John
Mark Keyes has argued that federal legislation on federal employees
would prevail over provincial legislation on the legal profession.15
Consider, for example, three scenarios:
1. The Minister of Justice and Attorney General of Canada, licensed
in Nova Scotia, agrantly violates his duty to encourage respect for
the administration of justice by making unsupported allegations of
improper conduct against the Chief Justice of Canada.16 Can he be
disciplined by the Nova Scotia Barristers’ Society?
2. A lawyer for the federal Department of Justice, licensed in
Manitoba, potentially violates his duty of loyalty by seeking a
declaration that the Minister and the Department are misinterpreting
key legislation regarding compliance with the Canadian Charter of

10. As I will discuss below, there is a line of cases holding that they cannot. See below notes 50 to
68 and corresponding text.
11. Deborah MacNair, “The Role of the Federal Public Sector Lawyer: From Polyester to Silk”
(2001) 50 UNBLJ 125 at 162. MacNair does not elaborate, but continues to state that “the Department
[of Justice] does attempt to respect, to the extent that it can, the regulatory authority of the law society.”
[McNair, “Silk”].
12. Deborah MacNair, “Legislative Drafters: A Discussion of Ethical Standards from a Canadian
Perspective” (2003) 24:2 Stat L Rev 125 at 134-135 (concluding at 135 that federal legislative drafters
cannot be required to be lawyers) [MacNair, “Legislative Drafters”].
13. Ibid at 134-135; [1980] 2 FC 199, 32 NR 613 (CA) [Lefebvre cited to FC].
14. See below notes 50 to 56 and accompanying text.
15. John Mark Keyes, “Professional Responsibilities of Legislative Counsel” (2011) 5 JPPL 11 at
16 [Keyes, “Legislative Counsel”]. Keyes relies on Mangat, supra note 4. This reliance has been
questioned: Martin, “Government Lawyers’ Political Activity,” supra note 2 at 299-300.
16. See e.g. Cotter, supra note 2, discussing Peter MacKay.
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Rights and Freedoms.17 Can he be disciplined by the Law Society of
Manitoba?
3. The Minister of Justice and Attorney General of Canada, licensed in
Ontario, secretly records a conversation in potential violation of the
rules of professional conduct.18 Can she be disciplined by the Law
Society of Ontario?
The answers to all three questions are currently unclear because of
federalism considerations.
This article aims to resolve this uncertainty in the literature and case
law. It is organized in three parts. In Part I, I set out the necessary legal
background for my analysis. In Part II, I analyze the implications of
federalism for the regulation of lawyers for the federal government. Part II
advances three propositions:
1. Absent a federally-imposed requirement to the contrary, employees of
the federal government can practice law without being licensed by the
corresponding provincial law society (or any law society).
2. But if they happen to be licensed by a law society, they can be
disciplined by that law society.
3. Parliament can immunize federal government lawyers from law
society regulation, including law society discipline.
In Part III, I consider Elizabeth Sanderson’s intriguing inspiration for a
separate regulatory regime for federal government lawyers, concluding
that it warrants serious consideration.
I. Background
In this part I set out the necessary legal background for my analysis by
identifying the three relevant federalism doctrines and by canvassing
federal jurisdiction over the practice of law.
1. Federalism doctrines
The question of whether federal government lawyers are subject to
provincial legislation on the practice of law can potentially engage three
distinct federalism doctrines—although, as I will demonstrate below in
17. Schmidt v Canada (Attorney General), 2018 FCA 55, 421 DLR (4th) 530, aff’g 2016 FC 269,
[2016] 3 FCR 477 [Schmidt FC], leave to appeal to SCC denied 4 April 2019 (38179); Canadian
Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada
Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11 [Charter]. See Keyes, “Loyalty,” supra note 2; Andrew Flavelle Martin,
“Folk Hero or Legal Pariah? A Comment on the Legal Ethics of Edgar Schmidt and Schmidt v Canada
(Attorney General)” (2020) Man LJ [forthcoming].
18. Jamie Strashin, “Wilson-Raybould may not have broken the law, but her Wernick tape crossed
ethical lines, lawyers say” CBC News (3 April 2019), online: <www.cbc.ca/news/politics/wilsonraybould-tape-1.5082119> [https://perma.cc/8648-6SY7], discussing Jody Wilson-Raybould. See also
Martin, “SNC-Lavalin,” supra note 2.
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Part II, it is not always clear which of these three doctrines courts are
applying. Here I provide a brief introduction to the three.
One doctrine, and indeed the one that I will argue is the most appropriate
to apply, is paramountcy. Where both a federal law and a provincial law
are validly enacted under corresponding heads of power, and there is
an inconsistency between them, the provincial law is “inoperative” (but
only to the extent of that inconsistency) and the federal law prevails.19
Most important for the purposes of this article is that there will be an
inconsistency where compliance with both laws is impossible or the
provincial law frustrates the federal law’s purpose.20
A second doctrine is interjurisdictional immunity. Under
interjurisdictional immunity, a law that “impairs” the “core” of one of
the other government’s heads of power is “inapplicable” to the extent of
such impairment.21 Unlike paramountcy, interjurisdictional immunity
is engaged even when that other level of government has not exercised
that core power through legislation.22 The Supreme Court of Canada in
Canadian Western Bank v Alberta was explicit that interjurisdictional
immunity should be applied only where paramountcy does not provide an
answer.23
A third doctrine is the immunity of the federal Crown from provincial
statutes. Under this immunity, provincial legislation does not “bind” the
federal Crown: “a Provincial Legislature cannot in the valid exercise
of its legislative power, embrace the Crown in right of Canada in any
compulsory regulation.”24 However, the Crown may incur or bring itself
into coverage of the law: “[t]his does not mean that the federal Crown may
not nd itself subject to provincial legislation where it seeks to take the

19. See e.g. Peter W Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada, 5th ed supp (Toronto: Thomson Reuters
Canada, 2017), vol 1 (loose-leaf revision 2017-1), ch 16 at 16.1, pages 16-2 to 16-3; ch 15 at 15.8(a),
page 15-28 (quotation is from page 15-28).
20. See e.g. Canadian Western Bank v Alberta, 2007 SCC 22 at para 73, [2007] 2 SCR 3 [Canadian
Western Bank]; Hogg, supra note 19, ch 16 at 16.3(a), page 16-4; 16.3(b), page 16-10.1.
21. Canadian Western Bank, supra note 20 at para 48 (“impairs” and “core”); Hogg, supra note 19,
ch 15 at 15.8(a), page 15-28 (“inapplicable”).
22. See e.g. Hogg, supra note 19, ch 15 at 15.8(c), page 15-35. See also Canadian Western Bank v
Alberta, supra note 20 at para 34: “If that authority is truly exclusive, the reasoning goes, it cannot be
invaded by provincial legislation even if the federal power remains unexercised.”
23. Canadian Western Bank, supra note 20 at paras 77-78. See also para 33: “Interjurisdictional
immunity is a doctrine of limited application.”
24. Her Majesty in right of the Province of Alberta v Canadian Transport Commission, [1978] 1
SCR 61 at 72, 75 DLR (3d) 257; see e.g. Hogg, supra note 19, ch 10 at 10.9(c), (d), pages 10-19 to
10-21.
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benet thereof.”25 Whereas interjurisdictional immunity is “[i]n theory…
reciprocal” or symmetrical,26 federal Crown immunity is not.27 I note here
that this constitutional doctrine of federal Crown immunity is distinct from
the statutory interpretation issue of whether a provincial statute binds the
federal Crown.28
Crown immunity, including federal Crown immunity, does not always
apply to Crown agents, but only where there is “prejudice” to the Crown:
The courts have been properly cautious in extending to individual Crown
servants the Crown’s immunity from statute law. The mere fact that a
Crown servant is acting in the course of employment will not entitle the
servant to the Crown’s immunity. The Crown servant will be entitled to
immunity only if it can be established that compliance with the statute
would prejudice the Crown.29

Moreover, Peter Hogg argues that the existence and correctness of this
federal Crown immunity as a constitutional doctrine is unclear and that
“where the federal Crown is engaging in activity which is regulated by
provincial law, it should be bound by the law.”30
2. Federal jurisdiction over the practice of law
While the provinces have legislative authority over lawyers and the practice
of law under section 92(13) and perhaps section 92(14) of the Constitution
Act, 1867, this does not preclude some federal jurisdiction over lawyers
and the practice of law under the federal heads of power. Parliament can
allow the unlicensed practice of law in three kinds of contexts: federal
boards and tribunals, provincial courts in areas of federal jurisdiction, and
federal courts.

25. Her Majesty in right of the Province of Alberta v Canadian Transport Commission, supra note
24 at 72. See more recently World Bank Group v Wallace, 2016 SCC 15 at para 97, [2016] 1 SCR
207: “The “benet/burden” principle is a common law exception to the Crown’s presumed immunity
from statute, which applies when the Crown accepts a statutory benet that has a sufcient nexus
with an attendant burden. The exception is intended to prevent the Crown from simultaneously taking
advantage of rights conferred by legislation while invoking its own immunity to shield itself from
related liabilities or restrictions.”
26. Canadian Western Bank, supra note 20 at para 35.
27. See e.g. Hogg, supra note 19, ch 10 at 10.9(f), page 10-22.
28. Ibid, ch 10 at 10.9 (a), (b), pages 10-18 to 10-19. See also Peter W Hogg, Patrick J Monahan &
Wade K Wright, Liability of the Crown, 4th ed (Toronto: Thomson Reuters Canada, 2011) at 451: “a
constitutional question lurks in the background of the interpretative question.”
29. Hogg, Monahan & Wright, supra note 28 at 446. The same text in the third edition was quoted
with approval in Breton c Comité de discipline de l’Ordre professionnel des travailleurs sociaux du
Québec, 2005 QCCA 195 at para 22, [2005] RJQ 432 [Breton]. Thank you to a reviewer for bringing
Breton to my attention.
30. Hogg, supra note 19, ch 10 at 10.9(d), pages 10-20 to 10-21.

The Implications of Federalism for the Regulation
of Federal Government Lawyers

371

The Supreme Court of Canada in Mangat held that Parliament can
allow non-lawyers to appear before the Immigration and Refugee Board,
and provide related services, even though such appearances constitute the
unlicensed practice of law under provincial legislation, under its power
over “naturalization and aliens” under section 91(25) of the Constitution
Act:
Flowing from this jurisdiction over aliens and naturalization is the
authority to establish a tribunal to determine immigration rights in
individual cases as part of the administration of these rights. Also owing
from this jurisdiction is the authority to provide for the powers of such a
tribunal and its procedure including that of appearance before it.31

At the same time, “representation before a tribunal has as its object the
determination of legal rights. It falls within the scope of legal representation
and the practice of law” and thus provincial jurisdiction.32 That is,
“Parliament must be allowed to determine who may appear before the
tribunals it has created, and the provinces must be allowed to regulate the
practice of law as they have always done.”33 Justice Gonthier for the Court
held that there was “an operational conict” between the federal law and
the provincial legislation, because Parliament “was pursuing the legitimate
objective of establishing an informal, accessible (in nancial, cultural,
and linguistic terms), and expeditious process, peculiar to administrative
tribunals”—and dual compliance, while technically possible, “would go
contrary to Parliament’s purpose.”34 That is, “it is impossible to comply
with the provincial statute without frustrating Parliament’s purpose.”35
(The Supreme Court of Canada has subsequently claried that the branch

31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

Mangat, supra note 4 at para 34.
Ibid at para 38.
Ibid at para 50 [emphasis added].
Ibid at para 72.
Ibid at para 73
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of paramountcy engaged in Mangat was frustration of purpose, not
operational conict.36)
While the decision in Mangat concerned only the Immigration and
Refugee Board, it would apply to federal tribunals more broadly, so long
as those tribunals were validly created under a federal head of power.
Justice Gonthier noted that “[m]any federal tribunals allow representation
by counsel other than barristers or solicitors” and that Parliament’s
objective regarding those tribunals was similar to the specic objective in
Mangat: “[r]epresentation by non-lawyers is consistent with the purpose
of such administrative bodies, which is to facilitate access and decrease
the formality of these bodies as well as to acknowledge the expertise of
other classes of people.”37 Although the question was not squarely raised
in Mangat, Mangat appears to recognize that Parliament can also allow
the federal government to be represented before federal tribunals by nonlawyers.38
The second context in which Parliament can allow the unlicensed
practice of law is before provincial courts in matters under federal
jurisdiction. The best example here is the Criminal Code provisions
allowing a non-lawyer agent to appear in summary conviction proceedings,
which were held intra vires Parliament in R v Romanowicz as criminal

36. See e.g. Saskatchewan (Attorney General) v Lemare Lake Logging Ltd, 2015 SCC 53 at para
19, [2015] 3 SCR 419 [citation omitted]: “Under the second branch of the paramountcy analysis,
provincial legislation will be found to be inoperative when it frustrates the purpose of a federal law….
In Law Society of British Columbia v. Mangat, [2001] 3 S.C.R. 113, for example, this Court held
that provincial legislation prohibiting non-lawyers from practising law for a fee before a tribunal,
conicted with federal legislation providing that a non-lawyer could represent a party before the
Immigration and Refugee Board, even for a fee. Acknowledging that dual compliance was not
strictly impossible because a person could either join the Law Society or not charge a fee, the Court
nonetheless found the provincial law to be ‘contrary to Parliament’s purpose’: para. 72.” See also e.g.
Alberta (Attorney General) v Moloney, 2015 SCC 51 at para 26, [2015] 3 SCR 327: “The application
of a more restrictive provincial law may, however, frustrate the federal purpose if the federal law,
instead of being merely permissive, provides for a positive entitlement.” See also Côté J at para 120,
dissenting but not on this point [citations omitted]: “In my view, the Court actually found in that
case [Mangat] that there was no operational conict (as that concept is understood today), as it noted
in the above passage that the statutes at issue allowed dual compliance at a ‘supercial level’; the
words ‘supercial level’ corresponded to the operational conict branch. And it then found that dual
compliance was not possible on the basis of an ‘expanded interpretation,’ …; the words ‘expanded
interpretation’ referred to the frustration of purpose branch.”
37. Mangat, supra note 4 at para 58.
38. Ibid at para 30: “The ofcers who appear on behalf of the Minister…are not required to be
lawyers or have any legal training.”
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procedure under 91(27) of the Constitution Act, 1867.39 While the Court
in Romanowicz did not engage in a paramountcy analysis—apparently
because the Law Society Act prohibited unlicensed practice “except
as provided by law,” and a valid federal law qualied as “provided by
law”40—the Criminal Code would prevail over the provincial legislation
on the legal profession via paramountcy.
Admittedly, Romanowicz and Mangat both become less clear after
R v Toutissani.41 Romanowicz and Mangat suggest that, if provincial
legislation prohibited non-lawyers from appearing in summary conviction
matters, the Criminal Code provisions allowing non-lawyers to appear
would prevail via paramountcy, and specically frustration of purpose.
Toutissani holds that the provincial legislatures can impose additional
qualications on non-lawyer agents despite the Code provisions. There
is no conict, because the prospective agent “can become licensed under
the provincial law,” and because “parliament’s purpose in permitting
defendants on summary conviction matters to be represented by nonlawyers is furthered”—not impaired—“by the provincial legislation.”42
While Casey Prov Ct J in Toutissani purported to distinguish Mangat, he is,
with respect, unconvincing.43 If the goal is to allow representation by nonlawyers, which will presumably be more accessible than representation
by lawyers as was the case in Mangat, a parallel system of requirements
runs the risk of making these non-lawyers subject to the kinds of costs
that make non-lawyers attractive in the rst place—i.e.. frustrating the
purpose of allowing representation by non-lawyers. Thus Toutissani, as a
provincial court decision, ultimately seems inconsistent with the decisions
in Romanowicz and Mangat that were binding on Casey Prov Ct J.
The third context in which Parliament can allow the unlicensed
practice of law is before federal courts created under section 101 of the
Constitution Act, 1867. The power to create these courts would necessarily
include the power to govern the right of appearance before them. The
Federal Courts Act and the Supreme Court Act allow those who are
39. R v Romanowicz (1999), 45 OR (3d) 506 at paras 15-20, 178 DLR (4th) 466 (CA), Carthy,
Doherty & Laskin JJA. This is not the only example. A non-lawyer trustee performing functions under
the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, RSC 1985, c B-3 for a fee is not illegally practicing law, as that Act
prevails over provincial legislation on the practice of law via the doctrine of paramountcy: Barreau du
Quebec c Marcoux, [1988] RJQ 1457.
40. Romanowicz, supra note 39 at para 23.
41. R v Toutissani, 2008 ONCJ 139, [2008] OJ No 1174 (QL).
42. Ibid at paras 27, 30.
43. In fairness to Casey Prov Ct J, the court in Romanowicz, supra note 39 at para 88, opened
the door for Toutissani when it observed that “[u]nregulated representation by agents who are not
required to have any particular training or ability in complex and difcult criminal proceedings where
a person’s liberty and livelihood are at stake invites miscarriages of justice.”
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“barristers or advocates in a province” or “attorneys or solicitors of the
superior courts in a province” to practice in those roles before the Federal
Court, the Federal Court of Appeal, and the Supreme Court of Canada.44
The Tax Court of Canada Act is to similar effect.45 But the Court Martial
Appeal Court Rules go further, recognizing as counsel not only those
“entitled by law to practise as barristers or advocates in any province
or territory of Canada” but also those who are “assigned to practise in
the Court by the Judge Advocate General.”46 The Tax Court of Canada
Act also allows appearances by non-lawyer agents for “all parties”—not
just the taxpayer—under its informal procedure.47 Again, to the extent
that these federal statutes are inconsistent with legislation on the legal
profession, they would prevail via paramountcy.48
II. The implications of federalism for the regulation of lawyers for the
federal government
In this part, I analyze the implications of federalism for the regulation
of lawyers for the federal government. I set out and advance three
consecutive propositions. The rst proposition is that employees of
the federal government can practice law without being licensed by the
corresponding provincial law society (or any law society), absent a
federally-imposed requirement to the contrary. The second proposition is
that if federal government lawyers nonetheless happen to be licensed by
a law society, they can be disciplined by that law society. And the third
proposition is that Parliament can immunize federal government lawyers
from law society discipline.
1. Federal government “lawyers” can practice without being licensed
by a law society
I rst argue that employees of the federal government can practice law
without being licensed by a law society. There is a line of cases holding
that employees of the federal government can practice professions
without being licensed or otherwise complying with provincial legislation
governing those professions. While these cases do not address lawyers
44. Supreme Court Act, RSC 1985, c S-26, ss 22-23; Federal Courts Act, RSC 1985, c F-7, ss 11(1),
(2).
45. Tax Court of Canada Act, RSC 1985, c T-2, s 17.1(2): “Every person who may practise as a
barrister, advocate, attorney or solicitor in any of the provinces may so practise in the Court and is an
ofcer of the Court.”
46. Court Martial Appeal Court Rules, SOR/86-959, made under s 244(1) of the National Defence
Act, RSC 1985, c N-5, r 19(2).
47. Tax Court of Canada Act, supra note 45, ss 18, 18.14.
48. Since legal ofcers in the Canadian Forces are servants of the federal Crown, the appearance
rights in the Court Martial Appeal Court Rules might also prevail via federal Crown immunity.
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specically,49 the same reasoning would appear to apply to lawyers—
except perhaps for an argument around independence of the bar. However,
courts may exercise their inherent jurisdiction to refuse to allow nonlawyers to appear before them.
In Lefebvre, the Federal Court of Appeal held that a federal government
employee could engage in what would otherwise be the provincially
regulated profession of chemists without complying with corresponding
provincial legislation, because the provinces cannot interfere with the
federal government’s choice of personnel:
the statutes adopted by a provincial legislature cannot limit the power
enjoyed by the federal government to choose whomever it will to
perform the administrative functions falling within its jurisdiction…. The
performance by the federal government of the administrative functions
pertaining to it requires that there be a federal Public Service. The power
to regulate hiring of its employees, like that of regulating their working
conditions, seems to me to belong exclusively to the federal Parliament.
It is for this reason that, in my opinion, statutes such as the Professional
Code and the Professional Chemists Act cannot be applied to federal
employees on account of acts which they perform in the course of their
duties. If that were not so, it would amount to saying that each of the ten
provinces could establish as it saw t the standards of competence that
the federal government should meet in hiring its personnel.50

Note here the specic language that these provincial statutes cannot “apply”
to federal employees—which suggests the doctrine of interjurisdictional
immunity, although Pratt JA never mentions that doctrine by name. In
drawing an analogy to the power “of regulating their [federal employees’]
working conditions,” Pratt JA cites Reference re Minimum Wage Act
(Saskatchewan).51 In that case, the Supreme Court of Canada held that
provincial minimum wage legislation could not apply to federal servants.52
While Pratt JA does not cite a federal head of power for the hiring and
regulating of federal employees, it is best identied as 91(8).53
I note here that while it is not entirely clear from the text of Reference
re Minimum Wage Act which doctrine the court was applying, and thus
the doctrine for which Pratt JA followed the case, the Supreme Court of
49. As I will discuss below, one case does involve students-at-law. See below note 61 and
accompanying text.
50. Lefebvre, supra note 13 at 203-204.
51. [1948] SCR 248, [1948] 3 DLR 801 [Reference re Minimum Wage Act cited to SCR].
52. Ibid.
53. Constitution Act, 1867, supra note 4, s 91(8): “The xing of and providing for the Salaries and
Allowances of Civil and other Ofcers of the Government of Canada.” See below notes 67 and 68 and
accompanying text.

376 The Dalhousie Law Journal

Canada subsequently conrmed in Bell Canada v Quebec (Commission de
la Santé et de la Sécurité du Travail) that Reference re Minimum Wage Act
was an example of interjurisdictional immunity.54
Another complication in understanding and applying Lefebvre at
present is that the Supreme Court of Canada in Canadian Western Bank
narrowed interjurisdictional immunity, holding that the doctrine only
applies where the challenged statute “impairs,” not merely “affects,” the
relevant head of power: “[t]he difference between “affects” and “impairs”
is that the former does not imply any adverse consequence whereas the
latter does.”55 However, the language of Pratt JA appears to meet the
threshold of impairment. The adverse consequence is that the federal
government cannot freely choose and regulate its own employees, which
essentially defeats section 91(8).
Lefebvre was not a case about a prosecution for unlicensed practice,
but instead an appeal from the adjudication of a public service grievance.
The respondents had sought reimbursement for the professional fees they
paid to the Order of Chemists of Quebec, under a term of the collective
agreement that provided that professional fees would be reimbursed
“when the payment of such fees is a requirement for the continuation of
the performance of the duties of his position.”56 The employer lost the
grievance but prevailed on appeal.
This point of Lefebvre has been followed in several grievance
adjudications: nurses in Manitoba57; engineers in British Columbia58; and
nurses in Quebec.59 However, other decisions have noted that compliance
with legislation is required, and thus fees must be reimbursed, where
membership is a requirement of federal, not provincial, legislation—
such as for veterinarians whose duties involve functions for which the
Controlled Drugs and Substances Act and the Food and Drugs Act require

54. Bell Canada v Quebec (Commission de la Santé et de la Sécurité du Travail), [1988] 1 SCR 74
at 762, 51 DLR (4th) 161.
55. Canadian Western Bank, supra note 20 at para 48.
56. Lefebvre, supra note 13 at 200-201.
57. Chorney v Canada (Treasury Board – Solicitor General), 1985 CarswellNat 941 at para 17,
[1985] CPSSRB No 101 (QL).
58. Churcher and Treasury Board (Transport Canada), 1991 CarswellNat 2141, [1991] CPSSRB
No 115 (QL).
59. Barbas and Treasury Board (Veterans Affairs Canada), 1989 CarswellNat 1910, [1989] CPSSRB
No 111 (QL); Dagenais and Treasury Board (Department of Veterans Affairs), 1987 CarswellNat
1575, [1987] CPSSRB No 160 (QL).
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a provincial licence.60 Similarly, membership is required, and thus fees
must be reimbursed, where membership is a condition of employment.61
Lefebvre was followed by the Quebec Superior Court in Corporation
professionnelle des médecins vétérinaires du Québec c Hardy—a case
squarely about the unauthorized practice of a self-regulated profession.62
Hardy, an employee of the federal government, had practiced veterinary
medicine in the course of meat inspection in Quebec without being on the
roll of l’Ordre des Médicins-Vétérinaires.63 Justice Martineau held that the
relevant legislation could not bind the federal Crown:
Il est évident que les provinces ont toutes la compétence législative
nécessaire pour régir l’exercice de leur pouvoir. Cependant, en examinant
l’arrêt Lefebvre cité plus haut, et plusieurs autres, dans la même veine,
il est tout autant évident que la Couronne Fédérale n’est pas liée par les
Lois Provinciales en cause, soit celle sur les médecins-vétérinaires, ainsi
que sur le Code des professions.64

Justice Martineau continues in language similar to Lefebvre (before
explicitly adopting the language in Lefebvre), and specically cites federal
legislation that is to govern these matters:
… Si l’on devait régir les préposés de la Couronne Fédérale par la
législation provinciale, ou une portion d’icelle une telle exigence
imposerait un nombre de contraintes importances à l’exercice par
l’administration fédérale des pouvoirs de gérance qui lui sont dévolus
par la loi.
La Couronne Fédérale a légiféré en adoptant entre autres la loi sur
l’emploi dans la fonction publique, S.R.C. 1970, c. P-32 et la loi sur
60. Katchin v Canadian Food Inspection Agency, 2004 PSSRB 26 at paras 53 and 55, 2004
CarswellNat 952, [2004] CPSSRB No 25 (QL); Harper v Canadian Food Inspection Agency, 2002
PSSRB 87 at paras 53-54, 92, 2002 CarswellNat 5746, [2002] CPSSRB No 70 (QL); Controlled
Drugs and Substances Act, SC 1996, c 19; Food and Drugs Act, RSC 1985, c F-27.
61. Association of Justice Counsel v Treasury Board, 2015 PSLREB 23 at para 49, 2015 CarswellNat
781. Oddly, the government in the agreed statement of facts at para 4 conceded that “13. Law Society
statutes (regulations/ policies) state that anyone performing the duties of an articling student must be
registered with the law society in their jurisdiction (as an articling student, student-at-law, or whatever
other title is used by the law society in that jurisdiction). As such, articling students employed at the
Department of Justice are required to be registered by the law society in that jurisdiction.” And that
“14. All articling students are governed by the law societies in their jurisdiction, including being bound
by the professional codes of conduct in those jurisdictions.” I proceed on the basis that this concession
in a single grievance adjudication, while odd and unwise, does not bind the federal government.
62. [1986] JQ no 2357 (QL) [Hardy].
63. Ibid at paras 7-8.
64. Ibid at para 19. An unofcial translation is as follows: “It is clear that the provinces all have the
necessary legislative competence to govern the exercise of their powers. However, in examining the
Lefebvre judgement cited above, and others in the same vein, it is just as clear that the Federal Crown
is not bound by the Provincial laws in question, be it the one on veterinary surgeons, as well as the
Professional Code.”
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l’administration nancière, S.R.C., 1970, c. F-10, pour mettre sur pied les
cadres, les préposés et les employés ainsi que l’infra-structure nécessaire
à la réalisation de ses objectifs, entre autre, seule la Couronne Fédérale
peut déterminer et, de fait, a déterminé par ses lois, les préposés ou autres
employés dont elle a besoin pour assurer une saine administration.
Appliquer la Loi Provinciale ou de la Couronne aux droits de la Province
dans le choix de ces personnes seraient imposer une grande entrave aux
droits, privilèges et prérogatives de la Couronne aux droits du Canada.
Établir des critères d’admissibilité et des conditions d’emploi
dans la fonction publique fédérale constitue un aspect essentiel de
l’administration de la fonction publique et de sa régie interne. Soumettre
l’exercice de tel pouvoir à une legislation provinciale constituerait une
intrusion qui aurait comme effet, de priver l’autorité fédérale de l’une de
ses compétences essentielles.65

Justice Martineau also relied on Canada (Attorney General) v St Hubert
Base Teachers’ Assn,66 in which the Supreme Court of Canada quoted
approvingly from André Tremblay’s conclusion that subsection 91(8) of
the Constitution Act, 1867 grants power beyond its explicit content of
“The xing of and providing for the Salaries and Allowances of Civil and
other Ofcers of the Government of Canada”67: “L’article 91(8) permet de
penser que c’était vraiment l’intention des hommes de 1867 de coner au
Dominion la réglementation totale des rapports entre la Couronne fédérale
et ses employés.”68 St Hubert Base, like Reference re Minimum Wage Act

Ibid at paras 39-42. An unofcial translation is as follows:
“If we had to govern the ofcers of the federal Crown through provincial legislation, or a
portion thereof, such a demand would impose a number of important restraints to the federal
administration’s exercise of governing powers conferred to it by the law.
The Federal Crown legislated by adopting, among others, the Public Service Employment Act,
RSC 1970, c P-32, and the Financial Administration Act, RSC 1970, c F-10, to establish the managers,
ofcers, and employees, as well as the infrastructure necessary to accomplish its objectives, among
others, only the Federal Crown can determine and as such, has determined through its laws, the ofcers
and other employees that it needs to ensure sound administration.
Applying the provincial law or the law of the provincial Crown in the choice of these people
would impose a great impediment to the rights, privileges, and prerogatives of the Federal Crown.
Establishing admission criteria and employment requirements in the federal public service
constitutes an essential aspect of public service administration and its internal management. Subjecting
the exercise of such a power to a provincial legislature would constitute an intrusion which would have
the effect of depriving the federal authority of one of its core competences.”
66. [1983] 1 SCR 498, 1 DLR (4th) 105 [St Hubert Base cited to SCR].
67. Constitution Act, 1867, supra note 4.
68. St Hubert Base, supra note 66 at 507, quoting from André Tremblay, Les Compétences
législatives au Canada et les Pouvoirs provinciaux en Matière de Propriété et de Droits civils (Ottawa:
l’Université d’Ottawa, 1967) at 239, n 461, which is quoted in Hardy, supra note 62 at para 37. The
ofcial English translation from the SCR is as follows: “Section 91(8) suggests that it was really the
intent of the statesmen in 1867 to give the Dominion complete control over relations between the
federal Crown and its employees.”
65.
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relied on in Lefebvre, is not completely clear on which doctrine is being
applied and does not explicitly use the term “interjurisdictional immunity.”
The Court in St Hubert Base held that Quebec labour legislation “has
no application” to an association of teachers on a military base.69 It also
described this proposition as stating that “the federal Crown cannot
be subject to provincial statutes regulating labour relations.”70 These
statements are consistent with interjurisdictional immunity, although
they could also reect federal Crown immunity to provincial statutes.
Moreover, the court in St Hubert Base does not identify federal legislation
that would prevail over the provincial legislation,71 and thus paramountcy
seems inapplicable. However, unlike Reference re Minimum Wage Act, the
Supreme Court of Canada has not in subsequent cases explicitly claried
which doctrine was applied in St Hubert Base.
Justice Martineau’s reasoning in Hardy appears to have two connected
arguments. The rst argument, which is not necessarily a constitutional
argument, is that the provincial legislation in question does not “bind”
the federal Crown.72 For the purposes of this argument it is sufcient to
note rst that Krieger must mean that the provincial Crown and provincial
government lawyers are bound by necessary implication by provincial
legislation on the legal profession,73 and second Hogg’s argument that a
provincial law that binds the provincial Crown will also bind the federal
Crown, at least as a matter of statutory interpretation.74 Justice Martineau
may also be invoking the constitutional doctrine of federal Crown
immunity from provincial legislation.
Justice Martineau’s second argument in Hardy, which is unquestionably
a constitutional one, is that provincial legislation cannot affect the federal
government’s power to select its employees. The precise nature of this
constitutional argument is unclear. Where he refers to other federal
legislation that governs these matters, it looks like paramountcy—but
elsewhere it looks more like interjurisdictional immunity.75

69. St Hubert Base, supra note 66 at 503.
70. Ibid at 507.
71. The school was authorized by an Order in Council under the National Defence Act, RSC 1970,
c N-4 (St Hubert Base, supra note 66 at 499-500), but there was otherwise no mention of federal
legislation that applied to the teachers.
72. See above note 64: “la Couronne Fédérale n’est pas liée.”
73. Martin, “Attorney General Immunity,” supra note 2 at 425-426.
74. Hogg, supra note 19, ch 10 at 10.9 (a), (b), (c), (d), pages 10-18 to 10-21.
75. See above note 65: “Soumettre l’exercice de tel pouvoir à une legislation provinciale constituerait
une intrusion qui aurait comme effet, de priver l’autorité fédérale de l’une de ses compétences
essentielles.”
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Indeed, Lefebvre and Hardy are both imprecise about which federalism
doctrine they are applying, interjurisdictional immunity or paramountcy or
federal Crown immunity. The more likely is interjurisdictional immunity:
insofar as they purport to apply to federal government employees, the
statutes on regulated professions encroach on the protected core of the
federal head of power over federal government employees in section
91(8) of the Constitution Act, 1867, and so are inapplicable.76 (Here the
federal government is the entity whose affairs are impacted by the law,
as well as the lawmaker whose head of power is affected by the law—
collapsing or defusing at least in part the doctrinal disagreement over
whether interjurisdictional immunity is really about the affected entity
or instead is really about protecting the head of power.77) Alternatively,
provincial legislation on regulated professions frustrates the purpose
of federal legislation on the hiring of government employees—which
purpose is to establish a complete set of conditions for, and restrictions
on, such hiring—and thus the provincial legislation is inoperative to the
extent of the inconsistency, via the doctrine of paramountcy.78
In the further alternative, the doctrine applied could be federal Crown
immunity: the provincial legislation cannot bind the federal Crown. As
mentioned above, this federal Crown immunity applies to Crown employees
only insofar as its absence would prejudice the Crown.79 However, both
Lefebvre and Hardy seem to suggest that the requirement to comply with
provincial legislation on regulated professions would prejudice the Crown
by restricting its choice and regulation of its own employees.
Given that the Supreme Court of Canada has since Lefebvre and
Hardy held that interjurisdictional immunity should be applied only
after paramountcy,80 and that there is some uncertainty in the caselaw
and literature over the application of interjurisdictional immunity,81 as
well as uncertainty over federal Crown immunity,82 paramountcy seems
the preferable approach. Under this approach, provincial legislation on
76. See e.g. Canadian Western Bank, supra note 20.
77. See e.g. Robin Elliot, “Interjurisdictional Immunity after Canadian Western Bank and Lafarge
Canada Inc.: The Supreme Court Muddies the Doctrinal Waters—Again” (2008) 43 SCLR (2d) 433
at 436 [Elliot, “Muddies”].
78. See e.g. Mangat, supra note 4.
79. See above note 29 and accompanying text.
80. See Canadian Western Bank, supra note 20 at para 67, as discussed e.g. in Robin Elliot, “Quebec
(Attorney General) v Lacombe and Quebec (Attorney General) v. C.O.P.A.: Ancillary Powers,
Interjurisdictional Immunity and “The Local Interest in Land Use Planning against the National
Interest in a Unied System of Aviation Navigation” ”(2011) 55 SCLR (2d) 403 at 429 [Elliot,
“Quebec”].
81. See e.g. Elliot, “Quebec,” ibid at 429-437.
82. See Hogg, supra note 19, ch 10 at 10.9(c),(d), pages 10-20 to 10-21.
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the regulated professions, including the legal profession, frustrates the
purpose of federal legislation on the public service, the purpose of which
is to fully govern the hiring and regulation of federal employees.
Thus, Lefebvre and Hardy stand for the proposition that federal
government employees can engage in the practice of regulated professions
without complying with provincial legislation, unless compliance is
required by federal legislation or as a condition of employment. As
mentioned above, MacNair uses Lefebvre to argue that federal government
lawyers, and specically legislative drafters, cannot be subject to provincial
legislation on the legal profession.83
However, one could argue that the legal profession is special because
of the independence of the bar. While this concept was not adopted as
a principle of fundamental justice in Canada (Attorney General) v
Federation of Law Societies of Canada (with Cromwell J for the majority
instead articulating a narrower conception that he termed “commitment
to the client’s cause”),84 the Supreme Court of Canada has nonetheless
clearly recognized its importance.85 The independence of the bar is
usually understood as independence from the state, but it can also refer to
independence from the client86—and for federal government lawyers, the
federal government is both the state and the client at the same time. By
tying these lawyers’ ability to practice to their employment status, arguably
these unlicensed “lawyers” lose both independence from the government
as client, and independence from the government as the state. However, it
is unclear how independence of the bar would operate as a legal barrier to,
as opposed to a policy argument against, federal government employees
practicing law without membership in a provincial bar.
Moreover, if Lefebvre and Hardy do permit the practice of law by
unlicensed employees of the federal government, it does not necessarily
follow that such employees can appear in court.87 If employees of the
83. MacNair, “Legislative Drafters,” supra note 12 at 134-135.
84. Canada (Attorney General) v Federation of Law Societies of Canada, 2015 SCC 7 at para 80,
[2015] 1 SCR 401 [Canada v FLSC].
85. See e.g. Attorney General of Canada v Law Society of British Columbia, [1982] 2 SCR 307 at
335-336, quoted e.g. in Canada v FLSC, supra note 84 at para 98.
86. See e.g. Alice Woolley, “Integrity in Zealousness: Comparing the Standard Conceptions of the
Canadian and American Lawyer” (1996) 9 Can JL & Juris 61 at 87. See also e.g. R v Samra (1998),
41 OR (3d) 434 at 447, 129 CCC (3d) 144 (CA), Rosenberg JA, quoting with approval from Arthur
Maloney, “The Role of the Independent Bar,” in Law Society of Upper Canada, ed, Special Lectures of
the Law Society of Upper Canada, 1979: The Abuse of Power and the Role of an Independent Judicial
System in its Regulation and Control 49 at 61-62 (Toronto: R De Boo, 1979): “[A] lawyer must never
allow himself to become a mere mouthpiece of his client.”
87. MacNair, “Legislative Drafters,” supra note 12 at 135 notes that legislative drafters do not
appear in court.

382 The Dalhousie Law Journal

federal government are immune to provincial legislation on the legal
profession, and can practice without being bound by that legislation, it
follows not only that such employees are immune from the jurisdiction
of the corresponding law society but also that they are not ofcers of the
court and are not bound by obligations to the court.88 How, then, should
courts respond to the appearance of such a person? It is trite law that courts
have the inherent jurisdiction to control their own process. Within this
inherent jurisdiction lies the discretion of courts to refuse appearances not
only by non-lawyers,89 but also by lawyers: “[i]t is within the inherent
jurisdiction of a superior court to deny the right of audience to counsel
when the interests of justice so require.”90 (The Supreme Court of Canada
in United States of America v Shulman was explicit that all courts
possess this inherent jurisdiction to control their own processes.91) Thus,
courts can—and perhaps should—deny the right of appearance to such
unlicensed employees.92
What about the federal Minister of Justice and Attorney General,
which comprised two of the three examples I gave in the introduction?
For similar reasons as federal government employees, the federal Minister
of Justice and Attorney General can practice law without being licensed.
As section 91(8) refers to “Ofcers of the Government of Canada,” and
not merely employees, this head of power should include Ministers.93 The
Attorney General is an ofcer of the Crown (indeed the chief legal ofcer),
and it would be troublingly inconsistent for Ministers (at least the Minister
of Justice) to not be.94
If we accept that Lefebvre and Hardy allow the unlicensed practice
of law by employees of the federal government (and the federal Minister
of Justice and Attorney General), the implications are signicant but not
dire. There is good reason to suspect that the federal government would

88. See e.g. BC Act, supra note 5, s 14(2); Ontario Act, supra note 5, s 29.
89. Romanowicz, supra note 39.
90. Everingham v Ontario (1992), 8 OR (3d) 121 at 126, 88 DLR (4th) 755 (Div Ct).
91. 2001 SCC 21 at para 33, [2001] 1 SCR 616 [emphasis added]: “Not only is the Court of Appeal
a forum of original jurisdiction for Charter purposes under the Extradition Act as a result of the 1992
amendments, but it also has, like all courts, an implied, if not inherent, jurisdiction to control its own
process, including through the application of the common law doctrine of abuse of process.”
92. This would also be a reasonable response by courts to any provincial legislation purporting to
allow government employees to practice law without being lawyers.
93. Alternately it could be the peace, order, and good government power. See below note 120 and
accompanying text.
94. See also Karen Horsman & Gareth Morley, eds, Government Liability Law and Practice
(Toronto: Thomson Reuters Canada, 2017) (loose-leaf release no 32, June 2019), ch 1 at 1.50.20(1),
page 1-46.5. noting that although Ministers are traditionally not employees at common law, they are
now considered part of the Crown.
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require, as a condition of employment, its lawyers to be licensed and in
good standing with at least one law society, as a cost-effective way of
ensuring basic competence.95 However, for purposes of mobility, one can
imagine the federal government not wanting its lawyers to be required to
re-license every time they changed provinces—under this approach, the
federal government might require its lawyers to be licensed only in any
one province, and not necessarily the province in which they carry out
their duties at any given time. Consider, for example, a federal government
litigator practicing in Halifax who is transferred to Ottawa. There may
be good reason to allow her to practice without an Ontario license if she
retains her Nova Scotia license. Indeed, Parliament could encourage public
condence by inserting a provision in federal human resources legislation
that requires employees practicing a profession to be licensed in at least
one province or territory. The spectre of an army of completely unlicensed
federal government “lawyers” is thus unrealistic. Moreover, case law
already provides that the Minister of Justice and Attorney General need
not be a lawyer,96 and so this conclusion from federalism does not change
the law in this respect, it merely reinforces it at the federal level.
2. But any federal government lawyers who happen to be licensed by a
law society may be disciplined by that law society
While Krieger may appear to contradict my rst proposition—that federal
government employees may practice law without being licensed by a
law society, absent a federally-imposed requirement to the contrary—it
does not. Instead, Krieger supports my second proposition: any federal
government lawyers who happen to be licensed by a law society may be
disciplined by that law society.
As mentioned above, the Supreme Court of Canada in Krieger
noted in obiter that provincial law societies have the same disciplinary
jurisdiction over federal Crown prosecutors as they do over provincial
Crown prosecutors. However, this observation relied on the fact that
federal Crown prosecutors were members of the corresponding provincial
law society:

95. Indeed, the Department of Justice currently requires that applicants for counsel positions
hold “[m]embership in good standing in a Law Society of one of the Provinces or Territories of
Canada.” See e.g. GC Jobs, online: <https://emploisfp-psjobs.cfp-psc.gc.ca/psrs-srfp/applicant/
page1800?poster=1319530> [https://perma.cc/4SJX-F7FM]. See also McNair, “Silk,” supra note 11
at 140.
96. Askin v Law Society of British Columbia, 2013 BCCA 233, 363 DLR (4th) 706, leave to appeal
to SCC refused, 35463 (7 November 2013).
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As members of their respective law societies, federal Crown prosecutors
are subject to the same ethical obligations as all other members of the bar
and not immune to discipline for dishonest or bad faith conduct.97

The Court took this membership as a given, and did not specify where the
requirement for membership came from. The holding itself in Krieger—
that provincial law societies have disciplinary jurisdiction over provincial
Crown prosecutors for all conduct other than matters of prosecutorial
discretion98—likewise relied on the fact that provincial Crown prosecutors
were required to be members of the corresponding law society. The Court
noted that:
To be a Crown prosecutor in Alberta, there are two requirements: (1)
employment as such by the Attorney General’s ofce and (2) membership
in the Law Society of Alberta. To keep his or her job, a Crown prosecutor
must perform to the standards of the employer, the Attorney General’s
ofce, and must remain in good standing by complying with the ethical
requirements of the Law Society. All Alberta lawyers are subject to the
rules of the Law Society—Crown prosecutors are no exception.99

However, as it did with federal Crown prosecutors, the Court took the
requirement of membership in the Law Society as a given for provincial
Crown prosecutors, and did not specify where that requirement came from.
Presumably, membership was a requirement because Crown prosecutors’
duties included the practice of law, and provincial legislation on the legal
profession permits practice only by members of the law society. Thus,
Krieger does not—in itself—hold that federal government employees
must be members of the law society to practice law.
It is important to emphasize here that the Lefebvre and Hardy line of
cases is not inconsistent with my interpretation of the obiter in Krieger.
Krieger states that federal prosecutors are subject to law society discipline
if they are members of the law society. It turns out, following Lefebvre
and Hardy, that federal government lawyers need not be members of a law
society.
Here I note that, even if federal Crown immunity indeed applies to
federal government lawyers as Crown employees, by joining a provincial
law society under provincial legislation on the legal profession, they are
agreeing to be bound by that legislation and subject to the regulatory
authority of that law society.100 This point is similar to that made in Breton
97.
98.
99.
100.

Krieger, supra note 4 at para 56 [emphasis added].
Ibid at para 60.
Ibid at para 41.
See above note 25 and accompanying text on the limitations of federal Crown immunity.
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c Comité de discipline de l’Ordre professionnel des travailleurs sociaux
du Québec, in which a social worker in the Canadian Forces had registered
with the Order not because he was required to but in order to have the right
to practice after he had left the Forces:101
En agissant ainsi, il a choisi de s’assujettir à la discipline de l’Ordre
et, conséquemment, aux normes déontologiques que celui-ci détermine
pour ses membres…. L’adhésion à un ordre professionnel confère des
privilèges mais elle entraîne, également, des obligations; on ne peut se
réclamer des droits et prétendre se soustraire aux devoirs.102

Justice Otis is explicit that one cannot voluntarily come under the
jurisdiction of a professional regulator for some purposes but not others.103
Like the social worker in Breton, federal government lawyers are not
required to join a law society, but any lawyer who chooses to do so must
accept the obligations that come along with that membership.
Thus, my rst proposition—that federal government “lawyers” may
practice law without being licensed by a law society, absent a federallyimposed requirement to the contrary—is qualied by my second
proposition: that any federal government lawyers who happen to be
licensed by a law society may be disciplined by that law society.
A wrinkle: The Ontario Barristers Act and federal Attorneys General
Before proceeding to my third proposition, I pause to note a caveat to my
second proposition. While any federal government lawyers who happen
to be licensed by a law society may be disciplined by that law society,
there may be an exception for federal Attorneys General called under
the Ontario Barristers Act.104 This provision essentially provides that a
federal Attorney General is entitled, purely by virtue of being appointed
the federal Attorney General, to be called to the Ontario bar:

101. Breton, supra note 29 at para 20: “il s’était inscrit à l’Ordre an d’avoir le droit d’exercer sa
profession après avoir quitté les Forces.”
102. Ibid at paras 19, 20 [citation omitted]. An unofcial translation is as follows: “In doing so,
he chose to submit to the discipline of the Order and, consequently, to the ethical standards that it
determines for its members…. Membership in a professional order confers privileges, but it also
entails obligations; we cannot claim rights and pretend to evade duties.”
103. Ibid at para 20: “On ne peut s’inscrire au tableau d’un ordre professionnel à la seule n d’assurer
la validité de son permis d’exercice professionnel.” An unofcial translation is as follows: “You
cannot register on the roll of a professional order for the sole purpose of ensuring the validity of your
professional license.”
104. Barristers Act, RSO 1990, c B.3. For example, Jody Wilson-Raybould was called under that
provision: Elizabeth Thompson, “Can Wilson-Raybould claim solicitor–client privilege over SNCLavalin?” CBC News (21 February 2019), online: <https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/wilsonraybould-lawyer-law-society-1.5027143> [https://perma.cc/7H8M-3Y7Q].
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A person who is or has been Minister of Justice and Attorney General
of Canada or Solicitor General of Canada is entitled to be called to the
bar of Ontario without complying with the Law Society Act or any of the
regulations or rules of the Society as to licensing, examinations, payment
of fees or otherwise, and is thereupon entitled to practise at the bar of Her
Majesty’s courts in Ontario.105

This provision dates back to 1891 and remains virtually unchanged.106 It
has not been considered in any reported case.
The manner in which this provision is drafted potentially creates
uncertainty over whether the Law Society of Ontario has regulatory and
disciplinary jurisdiction over such a lawyer. The provision does not require
compliance “with the Law Society Act or any of the regulations or rules of
the Society as to licensing, examinations, payment of fees or otherwise”
and grants an “entitlement” to practice in Ontario. The compliance that
is waived appears to be compliance with the conditions for entry to the
profession, i.e. to be called to the bar of Ontario. Thus, for example, a federal
Attorney General would not be subject to any assessment or proceedings
related to her good character. However, the addition of the “entitlement”
clause suggests that she could not face any restriction or suspension based
on disciplinary grounds (including competency grounds).
3. And Parliament can immunize federal government lawyers from law
society discipline
So far in this part I have argued that (1) federal government “lawyers” can
practice law without being licensed by any law society, absent a federallyimposed requirement to the contrary, but (2) any federal government
lawyers who happen to be licensed by a law society may be disciplined
by that law society. My third proposition, which qualies the second
proposition, is that Parliament can immunize federal government lawyers
from law society discipline. So long as there is a valid federal head of
power under which these immunity provisions t, they would prevail over
provincial legislation on the legal profession via paramountcy.
Why would disciplinary immunity be desirable? As mentioned above,
many if not most lawyers for the federal government will be licensed in
105. Barristers Act, supra note 104, s 1.
106. Jeanette Bosschart, “Lawyers and Lawmakers: A Statutory History of The Law Society Act, The
Barristers Act and The Solicitors Act, 1785–1993” (1994) 28 [LSUC] Gazette 171 at 187. See An Act
to amend the law as to Barristers and Solicitors in certain cases, SO 1891, c 35, s 1: “Any person who
is, has been, or shall be, Minister of Justice of Canada, if not already a member of the bar of Ontario,
shall be entitled to be called to the bar by the benchers of the Law Society of Upper Canada without
complying with any of the rules or regulations of the society as to admission on the books of the
society, examinations, payment of fees or otherwise, and shall thereupon be entitled to practice at the
bar in Her Majesty’s Courts in Ontario.”

The Implications of Federalism for the Regulation
of Federal Government Lawyers

387

at least one jurisdiction, and Parliament would be wise to require such
licensing. However, disciplinary immunity may nonetheless be desirable.
Here we can recycle the classic argument against civil liability as applied,
for example, recently in the context of disciplinary liability in Groia v Law
Society of Upper Canada.107 Arguably, the prospect of law society discipline
deters or chills lawyers from providing effective services, via the lens of
resolute advocacy, or otherwise. More specically, Crown prosecutors
and the Attorney General make difcult and controversial decisions on a
regular basis. (In response, one would admittedly note that many of those
decisions are already protected under prosecutorial discretion following
Krieger.) In civil litigation, particularly constitutional litigation, counsel
may also take unpopular positions and make controversial decisions. They
would seem to have a similar need as Crown prosecutors for disciplinary
immunity.
I will consider three groups for which Parliament may seek to provide
disciplinary immunity: federal Crown prosecutors, all federal government
lawyers (including federal Crown prosecutors), and the federal Attorney
General.
Following Krieger, Crown prosecutors comprise a likely group that
Parliament may wish to grant immunity from law society discipline. Here
the relevant federal head of power would be criminal law and procedure
under section 91(27) of the Constitution Act, 1867. Thus, the most intuitive
legislative vehicle for such an immunity provision would be the Criminal
Code. Parliament could also immunize the Attorney General, as a matter
of criminal law and procedure under s 91(27) of the Constitution Act,
1867, at least for actions taken pursuant to her duties and powers under
the Criminal Code. (I return to the scope of immunity below.) Indeed, it
would appear that Parliament could immunize both federal and provincial
prosecutors, and federal and provincial Attorneys General, under this head
of power.108 The reasons to immunize federal prosecutors and the federal
Attorney General would presumably apply equally to the immunization of
provincial prosecutors and the provincial Attorney General.

107. Groia v Law Society of Upper Canada, 2018 SCC 27, e.g. at para 76, [2018] 1 SCR 772:
“Nevertheless, when dening incivility and assessing whether a lawyer’s behaviour crosses the line,
care must be taken to set a sufciently high threshold that will not chill the kind of fearless advocacy
that is at times necessary to advance a client’s cause. The Appeal Panel recognized the need to develop
an approach that would avoid such a chilling effect.” For a forceful rejection of the chilling effect of
civil liability, see e.g. Hill v Hamilton Wentworth Regional Police Services Board (2005), 76 OR (3d)
481 at para 63, 259 DLR (4th) 676 (CA), MacPherson JA, aff’d (albeit a little less forcefully) 2007
SCC 41, [2007] 3 SCR 129.
108. Such provisions, if they were inconsistent with provincial law, would prevail via paramountcy.

388 The Dalhousie Law Journal

Alternately, Parliament could immunize federal Crown prosecutors
only, and/or all federal government lawyers and/or the federal Attorney
General, under the head of power in section 91(8) (federal government
employees) of the Constitution Act, 1867. This immunity provision could
be added to the Department of Justice Act and the Director of Public
Prosecutions Act,109 or perhaps to the Public Service Employment Act.110
Whichever approach is taken, the scope of the immunity provision(s)
must also be chosen. As an example, the provision of the Ontario Law
Society Act immunizing the Attorney General denes the scope of this
immunity: “No person who is or has been the Attorney General for
Ontario is subject to any proceedings of the Society or to any penalty
imposed under this Act for anything done by him or her while exercising
the functions of such ofce.”111 The original language in the bill that added
this provision granted immunity “for anything done by him while in such
ofce.”112 Presumably the former version, which preserves disciplinary
liability for extraprofessional conduct, would be preferable. The scope
may also be limited by the head of power used, which would be reected
in the legislative vehicle chosen. For example, an immunity provision for
the Attorney General in the Criminal Code would presumably, whether
explicitly in its text or implicitly, cover only conduct related to her
functions under the Criminal Code and related legislation.
I also note here the importance of precise language for the federal
Attorney General, who is also the Minister of Justice.113 As federal
legislation usually distinguishes between the two roles, referring to one
and not the other, legislators should turn their minds to whether they wish
to immunize activity in both roles or in one only. An immunity provision
should explicitly refer to both roles if the intention is comprehensive
immunity.
I acknowledge that, at rst glance, the reasons and powers for granting
immunity to federal Ministers, including the Minister of Justice and
Attorney General, might appear to be somewhat different than the reasons
for granting immunity to federal government lawyers. A primary concern
for Ministers would be that the law society regulatory discipline process,
109. Department of Justice Act, RSC 1985, c J-2; Director of Public Prosecutions Act [DPPA],
enacted by s 121 of Federal Accountability Act, SC 2006, c 9.
110. Public Service Employment Act, Part 7, ss 111-22 [PSEA], being Part 3 of the Public Service
Modernization Act, ss 12-13, SC 2003, c 22.
111. Law Society Act, supra note 5, s 13 [emphasis added].
112. Martin, “Attorney General Immunity,” supra note 2 at 437 [emphasis added].
113. Department of Justice Act, supra note 109, s 2(2): “The Minister [of Justice] is ex ofcio Her
Majesty’s Attorney General of Canada, holds ofce during pleasure and has the management and
direction of the Department.”
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and particularly complaints, could be used as a political weapon.114 While
the Attorney General’s non-partisan role should arguably prevail over his
or her political role,115 the Attorney General is indisputably a politician.116
With respect to the Attorney General in particular, given the Attorney
General’s many discretionary and controversial functions, similar chilling
effect concerns would apply as to Crown prosecutors and other government
lawyers.117 For these reasons, it may actually be more important to grant
disciplinary immunity to Ministers than to grant such immunity to federal
government lawyers. While Ministers are undoubtedly ofcers and not
employees, they are nonetheless part of the federal Crown under section
91(8) and so it would be within federal power to immunize them from law
society discipline.118
Thus the implications of federalism for the regulation of lawyers
for the federal government can be summarized as follows: (1) federal
government “lawyers” can practice law without being licensed by any law
society, absent a federally-imposed requirement to the contrary, but (2) any
federal government lawyers who happen to be licensed by a law society
may be disciplined by that law society, and (3) Parliament can immunize
federal government lawyers from law society discipline.
One method and reason to exempt federal government lawyers from
provincial law society jurisdiction would be to create a parallel regulatory
system for federal government lawyers, following Sanderson’s suggestion.
I turn to this possibility in the next part.
III. A federal government bar?
I have argued above that, while federal government lawyers are not
required to be licensed by any law society, Parliament would be wise to
require them to be licensed by at least one law society to ensure basic
competency and promote public condence.
Another option would be to create a unique federal licensing and
regulatory scheme for federal government lawyers—a federal government
bar, in effect. Sanderson has intriguingly suggested that Parliament could
create a separate code of conduct and “over-sight regim[e]” for federal
government lawyers that would “ous[t] provincial jurisdiction.”119
114. See e.g. Martin, “Lawyer-Politicians,” supra note 2 at 23-26.
115. See e.g. The Honourable Ian Scott, “Law, Policy, and the Role of the Attorney General:
Constancy and Change in the 1980s” (1989) 39:2 UTLJ 109 at 122.
116. See e.g. Krieger, supra note 4 at para 29.
117. See e.g. Martin, “Attorney General Immunity,” supra note 2 at 441-442.
118. Alternatively, authority over Ministers could be located in the peace, order, and good government
power. See below notes 120 to 122 and accompanying text.
119. Sanderson, supra note 2 at 3-5 [quotes are from 3 and 4].
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(Sanderson relies on Mangat, discussed above.) While Sanderson does not
go into detail as to what such a regime might entail, here I interpret that
idea as meaning a separate federal government bar. Indeed, this would be a
compelling reason to allow federal government employees to practice law
without belonging to a provincial or territorial bar. In this part I consider
whether this approach is indeed within the jurisdiction of Parliament and
what some of the advantages and disadvantages of this approach would be.
The idea of a separate federal government bar, while creative, appears to
be soundly supported by federalism doctrine and particularly the precedent
of Mangat combined with Lefebvre and Hardy. Legislation establishing
such a federal regulatory regime would prevail, via paramountcy, over
provincial legislation on the legal profession. Sanderson does not specify
which federal head of power would apply. However, for the reasons
discussed above, the most likely head of federal power would be subsection
91(8) of the Constitution Act, 1867. In the alternative, Parliament could
use the national concern branch of its peace, order, and good government
power.120 A federal government bar appears to meet the requirements
afrmed by the Supreme Court of Canada in R v Hydro-Québec:
For a matter to qualify as a matter of national concern in either sense
it must have a singleness, distinctiveness and indivisibility that clearly
distinguishes it from matters of provincial concern and a scale of impact
on provincial jurisdiction that is reconcilable with the fundamental
distribution of legislative power under the Constitution;
In determining whether a matter has attained the required degree of
singleness, distinctiveness and indivisibility that clearly distinguishes it
from matters of provincial concern it is relevant to consider what would
be the effect on extra-provincial interests of a provincial failure to deal
effectively with the control or regulation of the intra-provincial aspects
of the matter.121

The regulation of federal government lawyers appears to have a sufcient
singleness and indivisibility to qualify, as well as a relatively minor impact
on provincial jurisdiction over the practice of law. However, it is unclear
whether it has sufcient distinctiveness from the regulation of the rest of
the legal profession and whether there is a sufcient effect of a provincial
failure to address the intra-provincial aspects.122 Whether under subsection
91(8) or the peace, order, and good government power, such legislation
would prevail so long as the purpose of the legislation was clearly to
120. See e.g. R v Hydro-Québec, [1997] 3 SCR 213, 151 DLR (4th) 32 [Hydro-Québec cited to SCR].
121. Hydro-Québec, ibid at para 65, Lamer CJ and Iacobucci J dissenting but not on this point.
122. See e.g. ibid.
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establish a complete regulatory scheme for federal government lawyers—
i.e., to replace and not to supplement provincial regulatory regimes. Such
a regime could nevertheless incorporate, by reference, provincial codes of
conduct.123
The creation of a single federal regime would promote not just
mobility but also consistency and expertise. The Crown in right of Canada
is a single employer and single client with lawyers spread across thirteen
jurisdictions. While the Federation of Law Societies of Canada and its
initiatives promote consistency, there are limits to that work.124 Similarly,
the national mobility agreement provides only short-term mobility. The
federal government might prefer a single regime, which would facilitate
and simplify regulatory compliance as well as promote mobility. Such a
single regime would also accumulate and develop expertise in the unique
aspects of government lawyering. Commentators have emphasized that
government lawyering is different from private practice and that the rules
of professional conduct and some of the major regulatory concerns of the
provincial and territorial law societies simply do not apply to lawyers
for the government.125 For example, Adam Dodek notes that government
lawyers do not engage in advertising or marketing or hold client funds in
trust accounts, and thus “whole chapters in the applicable codes of conduct
are absolutely irrelevant to government lawyers.”126 Moreover, federal
government lawyers, to some extent like other lawyers for organizations,
face particular pressures—especially “client capture”—to which such a
regime could pay particular attention.127 Another benet would be that
government lawyers would almost by denition no longer be under-

123. Sanderson, supra note 2 at 4.
124. See for example Federation of Law Societies of Canada, Model Code of Professional Conduct
(Ottawa: FLSC, 2009, as amended 19 October 2019), online: Federation of Law Societies of Canada
<https://sc.ca/resources/> [https://perma.cc/FY6X-KFHF] [FLSC Model Code]. While the Model
Code has promoted uniformity, and most provincial and territorial codes of conduct mostly follow the
Model Code, some degree of variation persists.
125. See e.g. Dodek, supra note 1 at 4-5: “government lawyers and the work they do are largely
ignored. They are barely acknowledged in codes of conduct, underrepresented in law societies and
undertheorized in academic scholarship.” See also e.g. Allan C Hutchinson, “‘In the Public Interest’:
The Responsibilities and Rights of Government Lawyers” (2008) 46 Osgoode Hall LJ 105 at 106: “Not
only do the various ofcial codes of professional conduct remain almost silent in their applicability to
government lawyers, there is also a paucity of academic literature and professional commentary about
how these lawyers are supposed to approach their working obligations and institutional imperatives.
Yet this default approach…fails to recognize that the ethical duties and professional obligations
imposed on private lawyers do not transfer easily or usefully to the different context of government
lawyers.”
126. Dodek, supra note 1 at 11.
127. Ibid at 11, 13-15 (on “client capture”).
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represented as benchers in such a federal government bar.128 This kind
of specialized regulator would be able to focus all of its resources and
regulatory attention on government lawyers, perhaps making it more likely
that proactive regulation would be effective while wrongdoing would lead
to disciplinary consequences.129 As discussed above, there may also be a
concern that disciplinary liability has a chilling effect on resolute advocacy
by federal government lawyers.130 Regulation by a federal government
bar that better understands the dimensions and realities of government
lawyering would counteract in part that purported chilling effect.
Such a regime could include the Minister of Justice and Attorney
General, and potentially lawyer-politicians. If so, the regime would
have the opportunity to develop special expertise and appreciation of the
tensions Ministers face between their responsibilities as lawyers and their
roles as politicians.131
Moreover, such a regime could provide that federal government
lawyers are ofcers of all Canadian courts. This would afrm that they
have obligations to the court and so reduce, and perhaps eliminate, the
likelihood that courts would refuse them appearance rights because they
are not members of the corresponding provincial law society.
On the other hand, there may be suspicion among the bench and bar,
if not among the general public, that such a regulatory apparatus would
be overly lenient to its members. There would need to be clear separation
between the new regulator and the federal government in order to protect
the independence of the bar, in both reality and appearance. Such a regime
would also require an extensive bureaucratic infrastructure—however,
given the number of federal government lawyers, efciencies of scale may
well make such a regime more cost-effective than at least the smaller law
societies.
Federal government lawyers may also nd that a federal government
bar limits their career mobility and prospects. It is not clear how receptive
provincial law societies would be to the transfer and call of such lawyers
into provincial bars. Furthermore, the Constitution Act, 1867 would

128. Ibid at 4-5.
129. See e.g. ibid at 12, note 40: “the Crown qua client is unlikely to complain to the law society.
Representatives of the Crown, specically, senior government lawyers, are likely to take revelations
of misconduct by lawyers under their supervision very seriously and may encourage lawyers to selfreport to the law society or failing that, report the lawyer directly to the relevant law society.”
130. See above note 107 and accompanying text.
131. See generally Martin, “Lawyer-Politicians,” supra note 2.
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preclude appointment of members of a federal government bar instead of
a provincial bar as section 96 judges.132
While Sanderson does not identify the specic form that such a federal
regime could or would take, the principle of the independence of the bar
would suggest a form that tracks closely to the provincial law societies—
if for no other reason, so that federal government lawyers could not
reasonably be criticized for lacking the independence from the client and
employer that their provincial counterparts enjoy. A federal government
law society could be governed by benchers primarily elected from the
various provinces and territories, with some non-lawyers appointed by the
Governor in Council and some lawyers (such as the Minister of Justice
and Attorney General) as ex ofcio benchers. Such a bar should be armslength from the federal government in a similar way as the provincial
bars are arms-length from the provincial government. Indeed, the fact
that such a federal bar was composed solely of lawyers for the federal
government would make it more important, not less important, that there
be independence from the government as employer-client.
At minimum, for Parliament to require federal government lawyers
to belong to Sanderson’s federal government bar would be preferable to
the current state of the law, in which federal government employees can
practice law without being licensed. The simpler, though not necessarily
more cost-effective, alternative would be for Parliament to adopt legislation
requiring government lawyers to belong to at least one provincial or
territorial law society.
Thus, while Sanderson characterizes her proposal as “simply a matter
of possibly, constitutional theory, far from a likely policy choice at this
point,”133 it does have considerable advantages and warrants serious
consideration.
A federal bar could potentially extend even further than Sanderson
suggests, to include not only lawyers for the federal government but any
and all lawyers who serve federally-regulated entities such as banks and
airlines.134 (Such a regime would necessarily rely on the other heads of
power in section 91 and not merely section 91(8).) While beyond the

132. Constitution Act, 1867, supra note 4, s 97 [emphasis added]: “Until the Laws relative to Property
and Civil Rights in Ontario, Nova Scotia, and New Brunswick, and the Procedure of the Courts in
those Provinces, are made uniform, the Judges of the Courts of those Provinces appointed by the
Governor General shall be selected from the respective Bars of those Provinces.” Section 98: “The
Judges of the Courts of Quebec shall be selected from the Bar of that Province.” [Emphasis added.] I
thank a reviewer for this suggestion.
133. Sanderson, supra note 2 at 5.
134. I thank a reviewer for this suggestion.
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scope of this article, this is nonetheless a possibility which merits further
consideration.
Conclusion
In this article, I have assessed the implications of federalism for the
regulation of federal government lawyers. I have argued that federal
government employees cannot be required by provincial legislation to
be licensed by a law society in order to practice law; that, nonetheless,
any such lawyers who are so licensed are subject to the regulatory and
disciplinary jurisdiction of those law societies; and that Parliament can pass
legislation immunizing federal government lawyers from such discipline.
I have also considered the feasibility, advantages, and disadvantages of
a separate federal government bar and concluded that the idea warrants
serious consideration.
To return to the questions I posed in the introduction, all three lawyers
could potentially face discipline because all three were members of a
provincial law society at the time of the impugned conduct.135 However,
Parliament could pass legislation immunizing similarly situated lawyers—
as a class—from that discipline in the future.136
The focus of this article has been on law, and while legal considerations
are important they should not be allowed to eclipse policy considerations.
Questions of law society regulatory jurisdiction over lawyers—and the
ability of Parliament and the legislatures to interfere with that regulatory
jurisdiction, including discipline—go to the heart of administrative law
generally, and legal ethics and professionalism specically. Ultimately,
this article is a reminder to reect on the overriding purpose of law society
regulatory and disciplinary jurisdiction: to protect the public interest.137
Indeed, the Supreme Court of Canada in Krieger held that law societies
must have disciplinary jurisdiction over Crown prosecutors because their
disciplinary powers are uniquely able to protect the public:
A prosecutor whose conduct so contravenes professional ethical
standards that the public would be best served by preventing him or
her from practising law in any capacity in the province should not be
immune from disbarment. Only the Law Society can protect the public
in this way.138

135. Subject to my caveat about the third lawyer, the Attorney General called to the bar of Ontario
under the Barristers Act, supra note 104.
136. More controversially, Parliament could explicitly make that immunity retroactive.
137. See e.g. Law Society Act, supra note 5, s 4.2, para 3: “The Society has a duty to protect the public
interest.”
138. Krieger, supra note 4 at para 58.
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This statement applies beyond prosecutors to all government lawyers,
whether federal or provincial. To interfere with this disciplinary
jurisdiction is ultimately to erode the protection of the public interest. Any
legislated derogations from this disciplinary jurisdiction, though legally
and constitutionally permissible, should be adopted sparingly. For this
reason, Parliament would be wise to provide in federal legislation that all
federal government lawyers must be licensed by at least one Canadian law
society. Sanderson’s proposal—under which federal government lawyers
would be licensed and regulated by a separate federal regulatory regime—
is a more radical approach but nonetheless warrants careful consideration.

